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Extended Graded Modalities in Strategy Logic
lib:1fb376845f0a7853 (v1.0.0)
Authors: Benjamin Aminof,Vadim Malvone,Aniello Murano,Sasha Rubin
ArXiv: 1607.03354
Document: PDF DOI
Abstract URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.03354v1
Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy Logic (GradedSL), an extension of SL by graded quantifiers over tuples of strategy variables, i.e., "there exist at least g different tuples (x_1,...,x_n) of strategies" where g is a cardinal from the set N union {aleph_0, aleph_1, 2^aleph_0}. We prove that the model-checking problem of GradedSL is decidable. We then turn to the complexity of fragments of GradedSL. When the g's are restricted to finite cardinals, written GradedNSL, the complexity of model-checking is no harder than for SL, i.e., it is non-elementary in the quantifier rank. We illustrate our formalism by showing how to count the number of different strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria (NE), or subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE). By analyzing the structure of the specific formulas involved, we conclude that the important problems of checking for the existence of a unique NE or SPE can both be solved in 2ExpTime, which is not harder than merely checking for the existence of such equilibria.
ArXiv: 1607.03354
Document: PDF DOI
Abstract URL: http://arxiv.org/abs/1607.03354v1
Strategy Logic (SL) is a logical formalism for strategic reasoning in multi-agent systems. Its main feature is that it has variables for strategies that are associated to specific agents with a binding operator. We introduce Graded Strategy Logic (GradedSL), an extension of SL by graded quantifiers over tuples of strategy variables, i.e., "there exist at least g different tuples (x_1,...,x_n) of strategies" where g is a cardinal from the set N union {aleph_0, aleph_1, 2^aleph_0}. We prove that the model-checking problem of GradedSL is decidable. We then turn to the complexity of fragments of GradedSL. When the g's are restricted to finite cardinals, written GradedNSL, the complexity of model-checking is no harder than for SL, i.e., it is non-elementary in the quantifier rank. We illustrate our formalism by showing how to count the number of different strategy profiles that are Nash equilibria (NE), or subgame-perfect equilibria (SPE). By analyzing the structure of the specific formulas involved, we conclude that the important problems of checking for the existence of a unique NE or SPE can both be solved in 2ExpTime, which is not harder than merely checking for the existence of such equilibria.
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